Tag: South Africa

Categories : Healthcare Politics and RegulationsTags :

NHI Pause Should be Used to Build Stronger Healthcare Foundations

On By ModernMedia

By Haseena Majid and Mogie Subban

Universal health coverage cannot succeed with fragmented systems, weak data, and largely symbolic participation. A recent court-ordered pause to NHI implementation offers a chance to build the foundations properly, argue Dr Haseena Majid and Professor Mogie Subban.

Implementation of the NHI Act has been delayed following a High Court order, by agreement between the parties, prohibiting the proclamation or implementation of its provisions until the Constitutional Court rules on challenges related to public participation.

Beyond the legalities, the pause reveals something more consequential. Universal health coverage cannot succeed on fragile administrative foundations.

If the NHI is to deliver equity, efficiency and quality care, the state must first confront the structural weaknesses that continue to shape large parts of South Africa’s health system. These include fragmented governance across national, provincial and local levels that weakens coordination and accountability; persistent shortages of health professionals that leave facilities understaffed and overburdened; and weak information systems that limit the state’s ability to track performance, allocate resources effectively and plan services based on reliable data.

The NHI Act can mandate pooled financing and new purchasing arrangements, but financing reform alone cannot fix fragmented governance, uneven data systems or inconsistent coordination between stakeholders. When reforms are layered onto unstable administrative systems, the result is not transformation but increased risk.

The eye health example

Eye health illustrates this challenge clearly. This is because it depends on coordination across many parts of the health system including clinics, skilled cadres such as optometrists and ophthalmologists, hospitals, NGOs and screening programmes. When these stakeholders do not work together effectively, patients fall through the gaps.

South Africa’s burden of chronic disease is rising, and with it preventable vision loss. The International Diabetes Federation estimates that around 2.3 million people in South Africa aged 20–79 live with diabetes, a condition that can affect the eyes and lead to vision loss and blindness if not detected early. Studies in South Africa have reported high rates of diabetic eye disease, including prevalence estimates of 39% in a tertiary diabetes clinic in Durban and around 25% in primary care settings in Tshwane.

These figures are not simply about eye disease. They reflect gaps in chronic disease coordination, screening coverage and referral systems. When diabetic eye screening is inconsistent, when referral pathways are unclear and when health data are incomplete, preventable vision loss becomes far more likely.

Cataract surgery, one of the most effective medical procedures available, is rightly prioritised. Yet provincial reporting continues to show significant surgical backlogs. While numbers fluctuate, the pattern remains consistent: demand continues to outpace coordinated capacity.

Vision challenges are also increasing as the population ages. A KwaZulu-Natal study reported presbyopia prevalence of 77% among examined adults. As the population grows older, near-vision impairment becomes not only a clinical concern but also one that affects productivity, mobility and independence.

Taken together, diabetes-related eye disease, cataracts and age-related vision decline illustrate a predictable and growing demand for eye-care services. The burden is clear, but the health system response remains uneven.

Only around 6–7% of optometrists practice in the public sector, while the majority work in private urban settings. Across the country, eye-care services are delivered through a mix of public facilities, private practitioners, NGOs, outreach surgical programmes and school screening initiatives. Yet there is no single national picture showing who is providing which services, where those services are located, and how well they are functioning. Government therefore does not consistently have a clear view of which partnerships are active, which communities are overserved or neglected, what equipment is functioning at facilities, or how the workforce is distributed relative to need. This is not a minor administrative gap, instead it is a governance failure with real consequences.

No clear view

Government cannot plan for what it cannot see. Data gaps and poor system visibility are creating blind spots that will paralyse even the best financing reforms. Without clear stakeholder mapping and infrastructure audits, planning becomes reactive. Procurement decisions become distorted and workforce deployment misaligned. Funding reform under the NHI may change how services are purchased, but if the underlying service network remains fragmented, inefficiencies will simply be redistributed.

The consequences extend beyond clinics. Children with uncorrected vision problems struggle at school. Adults with untreated diabetic eye disease risk losing income and economic stability. Older persons waiting for cataract surgery may lose mobility and independence. When health systems fail to coordinate care, the costs are first absorbed by households and later by the state through disability, preventable complications and lost productivity.

The NHI Act aims to improve equity and purchasing efficiency. But efficiency depends on knowing where services exist and where they are missing. Equitable access depends on understanding how infrastructure and human resources are distributed. Quality oversight depends on reliable data that allows performance to be monitored. What the NHI pause ultimately exposes is unfinished work in health-system governance. South Africa does not lack policy ambition. The country is widely recognised for progressive health policy. The challenge lies in fragmented implementation, limited visibility of service networks and uneven coordination across institutions.

A strategic choice

The Department of Health now faces a strategic choice. It can wait for the courts to resolve the legal process, or it can use this moment to strengthen the operational foundations needed for equitable reform.

Eye health presents a practical place to begin. It may not command the urgency of oncology, emergency medicine or infectious disease management, but that is precisely why it offers an opportunity to test workable solutions. Even under the best financing model, sustainable eye care depends on coordinated collaboration between public facilities, private practitioners, NGOs and community networks. A focused national pilot could map eye care services geographically, combining stakeholder mapping with infrastructure audits and workforce distribution analysis. This would strengthen planning in eye health while providing the system visibility that large-scale purchasing reforms like NHI depend on. The efficiency gaps are already known. What is needed now is coordinated implementation. If government can demonstrate that fragmented service environments can be mapped and coordinated within eye health, it will create a practical reform model for other strained areas of the health system.

Universal health coverage will not be secured simply by moving money differently. It will be secured by making the system visible, coordinated and accountable. The current pause has given us more time. What matters now is whether it is used to build the governance foundations that real reform requires.

*Dr Majid is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the College of Law and Management Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Professor Subban is Academic Mentor and Public Governance Expert, at the College of Law and Management Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Note: Spotlight aims to deepen public understanding of important health issues by publishing a variety of views on its opinion pages. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily shared by the Spotlight editors.

Republished from Spotlight under a Creative Commons licence.

Read the original article.

Categories : Injury & TraumaTags :

South Africa is Bleeding to Death – and it’s Because of Guns

On By ModernMedia

It’s time to treat gun violence as a public health crisis

By Claire Taylor and Dean Peacock

Photo by Mat Napo on Unsplash

Every day in South Africa, 30 people are shot dead. Another 43 are shot and survive. That is more than one person shot every 20 minutes, around the clock, every single day of the year.

Those numbers are staggering, but they don’t begin to convey the cascade of harm that extends beyond the bodies that take the bullets.

Consider this experience of Professor Sithombo Maqungo, head of orthopaedic trauma at Groote Schuur Hospital. A grandmother admitted with a fractured hip is scheduled for urgent surgery on Friday morning. As she is being prepped for theatre, a gunshot victim is rushed in, bleeding out. He dies, but the grandmother’s surgery is postponed as the weekend’s trauma cases overwhelm the unit. By Monday, her condition has deteriorated — blood clots, pressure sores, pneumonia. She dies. Her death certificate will not record “gunshot wound” as the cause. But she is, without question, a victim of gun violence.

This is the ripple effect of gun violence. One shooting does not claim one life. It consumes blood supplies, monopolises theatre time, depletes Intensive Care Unit beds, exhausts healthcare teams, and drives skilled professionals — paramedics, nurses, surgeons — out of a system that can no longer support them.

South Africa’s healthcare system is treating gun violence, it is not preventing it. And that distinction matters enormously.

South Africa’s homicide rate is six times the global average, and guns are the dominant weapon in murder, attempted murder and aggravated robbery. Gun- related murders rose from 31% of all murders in 2020 to 44% by 2025. In several provinces, more people are shot than die on the roads, and in the Western Cape metropole, gunshots are the leading cause of spinal cord injury.

Young men are the primary victims and perpetrators of gun violence, but women are increasingly killed with guns. After declining, following the Firearms Control Act of 2000, gun-related femicide has surged — rising 84% between 2017 and 2020/21. By 2020/21, firearms accounted for more than one-third of all femicides, the highest proportion recorded.

Failures in firearm oversight and the growth in licensed guns have contributed to this reversal.

South Africa’s own evidence shows that regulation works. When the Act was properly enforced between 2000 and 2010 — guided by a five-pillar strategy that tightened regulations and reduced the availability of firearms — gun deaths halved, from 34 people shot dead daily to 18, while a woman died at the hands of an intimate partner every eight hours rather than every six hours because fewer women were shot and killed.

As oversight weakened through under-resourcing, corruption and policy drift, deaths rose again.

Today, licence applications are 66% higher than in 2016, with a record 166,603 new applications in 2024/25 alone — expanding the pool of legally held guns that leak into criminal hands or are used to commit crimes.

Illegal guns don’t come from nowhere

A common misconception is that tightening firearm laws is pointless because most crime guns are unlicensed. But illegal guns do not appear from nowhere: virtually every firearm in criminal circulation was once legally manufactured and legally owned before it was lost, stolen, or sold into the illegal market. In South Africa, civilians are by far the biggest source of this leakage. Over the past 20 years, civilians have lost or had stolen an average of seven guns for every one lost or stolen by the police, according to South African Police Service annual reports. In 2024/25 alone, civilians reported the loss or theft of 7,895 firearms — 22 a day — and this is almost certainly an underestimate, since some owners do not report losses for fear of being charged with negligence (police reported the loss/ theft of 572 service guns in this time).

Legal guns are also used directly to commit crimes, particularly in domestic violence, where murder-suicides involving licensed firearms are well documented.

Controlling legal gun ownership is not separate from addressing gun crime — it is the primary mechanism for doing so.

The public health approach

A key question in response to South Africa’s gun violence crisis is why gun violence remains outside the core public health frameworks — and what would change if it were treated as the preventable health crisis it is.

A public health approach treats guns the way we treat other products that harm health — like alcohol and tobacco — moving the response upstream from treating wounds to preventing them by tightening controls over availability.

It would give healthcare workers, overwhelmed by the relentless flood of trauma, the ability to recognise that gunshot wounds are not inevitable but a preventable crisis dependent on political will and policy intervention.

It would create concrete opportunities for the health system to play a proactive role in prevention — screening for firearm access during domestic violence consultations to support gun removal from high-risk situations; linking young gunshot victims in surgical wards with gang exit programmes; using admission and forensic pathology data to identify violence hotspots and inform targeted policing.

It would make the true costs of gun violence visible to policymakers and the public — revealing how much is spent managing a preventable crisis on limited resources and overstretched facilities that could instead go towards primary healthcare, cancer treatment, or diabetes care. And crucially, it grounds the debate in evidence rather than ideology — vital in a post-truth world where beliefs, opinions, and hearsay are routinely presented as fact.

This approach would also recognise that firearms are a product sold for profit that harms people’s health. Just as taxes on alcohol and tobacco reflect their social costs and reduce consumption, firearms, ammunition and shooting activities should be subject to equivalent measures. This would generate revenue that could fund the very health services overwhelmed by the consequences of gun violence.

This sharpens the policy response too. South Africa’s Firearms Control Amendment Bill, currently at Nedlac, proposes strengthening limits on who can own firearms, the type and number of firearms and ammunition rounds that can be held, and for which purposes.

Treating gun violence as a public health crisis strengthens the case for these reforms: it positions the Bill not as a security measure but as a health measure, demanding the same urgent political commitment we would expect for any leading cause of preventable death and injury.

International framework

None of this can happen in isolation. South Africa needs international frameworks, evidence, and solidarity — and that is where the World Health Organisation (WHO) comes in.

On 10 February 2026, the Global Coalition for WHO Action on Gun Violence launched with more than 100 organisations across 40 countries, including a range of South African organisations spanning healthcare, child and women’s rights, legal advocacy, violence prevention, and research. The coalition’s formation was accompanied by a stark finding: not one of the World Health Assembly’s 3,200-plus adopted resolutions explicitly mentions firearms.

This is a profound gap. The WHO sets global standards that shape national health policy across 194 member states. When it fails to treat gun violence as a health priority, countries like South Africa are left without the international frameworks, evidence, and technical guidance they need to act.

The WHO has done this before, with other contested, politically sensitive issues — tobacco, HIV/AIDS, alcohol, violence against women — each time moving them from marginal concerns into mainstream public health priorities with measurable results. A resolution on road safety catalysed legislative reform in more than 100 countries. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control contributed to lasting reductions in global tobacco use. The same is possible for gun violence.

The coalition is calling on the WHO to take ten key actions, including strengthening guidance on gun-related healthcare and supporting countries to use health systems as sites of gun violence prevention. South Africa — with some of the highest rates of gun violence in the world and a documented track record of evidence-based intervention — is uniquely placed not just to support this coalition, but to lead it by sponsoring a World Health Assembly resolution on firearm violence.

Our health professionals are close to breaking point. The surgeon who cannot cope with the relentless toll and resigns — leaving already stretched colleagues even more depleted. The paramedics who quit working in a war zone they never enlisted in. The medical students who leave the profession early, unable to bear the accumulated trauma of what they witness.

Gun violence is not inevitable. It is preventable. Treating it as a public health crisis is the only rational response to the evidence we already have.

Claire Taylor is from Gun Free South Africa, and Dean Peacock is from the Global Coalition for WHO Action. Views expressed are not necessarily those of GroundUp.

This is part of a series on gun violence. Previous article: I was shot in the head in 1986. I’m still paying the price

Republished from GroundUp under a Creative Commons licence.

Read the original article.

Categories : VaccinesTags :

A Balanced and Pragmatic Approach to Vaccines in South Africa’s Public Tender Process

On By ModernMedia

Media Statement from Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Association of South Africa (GBMSA)

Photo by Elen Sher on Unsplash

South Africa’s public tender framework has long recognised the importance of ensuring reliable, affordable, and uninterrupted access to essential medicines and vaccines, particularly for national immunisation programmes that protect children and vulnerable populations.

While local pharmaceutical manufacturing remains an important national objective, it is equally critical that public procurement decisions prioritise patient access, programme sustainability, and fiscal responsibility, especially in vaccine supply where scale, complexity, and affordability are decisive factors.

Vaccines require scale, specialisation and reliability

Vaccine manufacturing at national immunisation scale requires highly specialised infrastructure, advanced technical capability, strict regulatory compliance, and sustained capital investment. These requirements differ materially from those of many small‑molecule medicines.

“When it comes to vaccines, the overriding priority of the public tender system must be patient access. Scale, affordability, and uninterrupted supply are essential if South Africa is to expand and sustain its national immunisation programmes,” said Simo Masondo, Chairman of the Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Association of South Africa (GBMSA).

Although South Africa has made meaningful progress in strengthening elements of local pharmaceutical capability, vaccine manufacturing readiness varies significantly across product categories, and certain capacities continue to evolve. In this context, national immunisation programme must be supported by a calibrated combination of local and global manufacturing supply, particularly where programme expansion, continuity and affordability are at stake.

A tender system that prioritises supply reliability and scale is essential to ensuring that immunisation program can reach more patients, more consistently and without interruption.

Competitive pricing enables broader immunisation coverage

Competitive pricing and demonstrable value for money remain central to the sustainability of South Africa’s public healthcare system. The National Department of Health has consistently emphasised procurement principles that include value for money, open and effective competition, accountability, and equity.

In vaccine procurement, competitive tender outcomes directly enable:

  • Broader immunisation coverage
  • Greater reach to children and underserved populations
  • More efficient use of limited public healthcare resources

Affordability is not a secondary consideration; it is a core enabler of access.

BRICS partnerships as strategic enablers of vaccine access

Trusted international partnerships, particularly within the BRICS ecosystem, play a critical role in supporting South Africa’s vaccine supply objectives. Long‑standing collaborations with partners in countries such as India have consistently demonstrated scale, reliability, regulatory compliance, and significant cost efficiencies in national tenders.

Indian vaccine manufacturers have historically delivered substantial savings to the South African government, in some cases exceeding R2 billion on a single vaccine programme, while supporting the expansion and sustainability of national immunisation coverage.

These partnerships should be viewed not as alternatives to local capability, but as essential enablers of immediate access, affordability, and programme continuity, particularly in vaccine categories where local scale is still developing.

A pragmatic and patient‑centric path forward

“A pragmatic, balanced approach allows South Africa to meet today’s immunisation needs while continuing to build capability over time. This is not a choice between localisation and access; it is about sequencing decisions responsibly so that patients always come first,” Masondo said.

Such an approach ensures:

  • Reliable and uninterrupted vaccine supply
  • Expanded immunisation reach for South African children
  • Responsible stewardship of public healthcare funds
  • Long‑term programme sustainability
  • Strengthened international cooperation within BRICS and other trusted partnerships

By prioritising access, affordability, and scale in vaccine procurement, South Africa can protect its immunisation programmes today while continuing to build manufacturing capability over time, without compromising patient outcomes or fiscal sustainability.

Categories : Healthcare Politics and RegulationsTags :

A Double Roadblock to NHI Implementation

On By ModernMedia

The National Health Insurance (NHI) Act On Friday (20 February), it was reported that President Cyril Ramaphosa had put a halt on putting the NHI Act into effect, amid an array of legal challenges. Four days later, the Pretoria High Court granted an order to the same effect.

The NHI has probably been the most contentious piece of legislation passed in South Africa, and the developments since it was signed into law have been coming thick and fast. The promulgation, that is, putting the law into effect, of the NHI was long predicted to be the hardest part of getting this attempt at universal healthcare to work.

This latest court order restrains President Ramaphosa from any further work in promulgating the NHI Act – something which he had already announced he would do just a few days ago, as reported by BusinessTech. This represents something of a pause in the ongoing legal maelstrom – nothing can be decided until the court cases clear, according to an attorney’s statement on behalf of the President.

Almost as soon as the NHI was signed into law, an array of unions, hospitals, professional organisations and even the Western Cape government launched legal challenges. A ruling compelled the President to provide the records of his decision to sign the NHI into law. One key part governing where healthcare professionals could practice has already been struck down as unconstitutional by a July 2025 High Court ruling.

The lobby group AfriForum last week entered the fray with multiple challenges to the NHI’s constitutionality, aiming to force the government to scrap the NHI completely. A few days later, President Ramaphosa paused the NHI’s promulgation. This all came amidst discussion by the Department of Health into phasing out medical aid tax credits to begin the NHI Fund – which would squeeze many middle-class families out of being able to afford private healthcare. (For now at least, there is good news – just as QuickNews was typing this, it was announced that medical aid tax credits would be increased for 2026).

Experts and even the government itself have acknowledged that these legal challenges will further delay the already decades-long implementation of the NHI, and it appears that this has come to pass. Whether the NHI is modified to a workable version along the lines suggested by industry experts, or whether it is scrapped entirely and South Africa remains stuck with its deeply unequal public/private sector divide remains to be seen.

What is certain is that the NHI as originally envisioned simply isn’t affordable for South Africa – or even a wealthy developed country. The National Treasury seems to be aware of this, as suggested by its minimal allocations to the NHI Fund and medical aid tax credits being updated for this year’s budget.

Categories : Expert Opinion Healthcare Politics and RegulationsTags :

Russell Rensburg | Consolidate the Funding of South Africa’s District Health System: Why Reform can’t Wait

On By ModernMedia
The District Health Programme Grant is a mechanism for funding the country’s public health efforts, particularly relating to HIV, TB, and other communicable diseases.

By Russell Rensburg

District managers in South Africa’s public healthcare system currently have to juggle funding from multiple government budget lines, each with different strings attached. To improve district health services, we urgently need to simplify and integrate these funding flows, argues Russell Rensburg.

In his State of the Nation Address this year, for the first time in a long time, President Cyril Ramaphosa focused on the broader determinants of health, delivering the strongest message yet around the importance of prevention.

This included signalling reforms around the taxation and regulation of alcohol as well as announcing broad initiatives to improve child health through good nutrition.

And his announcement that government will be rolling out the HIV prevention injection, lenacapavir, means that South Africa stands at the cusp of a massive healthcare transition. The six-monthly injection will be a game-changer in the country’s ongoing fight against HIV.

His efforts must be applauded.

But to deliver on this, Ramaphosa will need a functioning district healthcare system. The challenge, however, is that the district healthcare system often functions in name, but not in practice. This disconnect is mostly due to how district-level services – and healthcare in general – is funded.

In short, we ask for integrated healthcare services in a system built on siloed funding streams. We task district managers with coordinating care, but the budgets they depend on are split across the provincial equitable share, multiple conditional grants, and hospital-level allocations.

Health is funded from national revenue through two streams: the national department of health and the provincial equitable share. The equitable share, which funds healthcare and education, is calculated using several factors including population size, use of services and potential unmet and future needs. The allocations are unconditional allowing provinces to determine all the allocations relative to provincial realities, cost pressures and needs. With national funding, 85% is transferred to provinces through defined use conditional grants to fund strategic priorities. The challenge is that in recent years these grants have become transfers to provinces with poorly managed conditionalities resulted in fragmented healthcare.

One way to fix these challenges is to consolidate all district health funding — including district hospitals — into a single, nationally coordinated expanded District Health Programme Grant. This reform would align the system with the National Health Act, strengthen accountability, and prepare us for the healthcare transitions ahead.

This shift is not about centralising services. It is about aligning authority with responsibility, and aligning money with the legal design of the health system. Provinces would remain responsible for service delivery. But national government — as required by the Act — would finally have a coherent instrument to guide, monitor, and support the district health system.

A fragmented system

Twenty-three years ago, the National Health Act set out a detailed framework for how healthcare should be structured in the country. Health policy norms and standards are set nationally. Provinces are responsible for coordinating and providing technical and operational support to districts. Crucially, the act locates the delivery of health services within the district health system, which is mandated to plan, coordinate and deliver comprehensive primary healthcare services closest to where people live.

Where the National Health Act falls short, is in providing guidance on how these powers and responsibilities would be financed.

Currently, district health services are funded through three streams:

  • The provincial equitable share, allocated nationally to each province based on population size and demand for health services. This covers most primary healthcare services and all district hospitals.
  • The District Health Programme Grant, which focuses on HIV, TB, community outreach, and some primary healthcare enablers.
  • And thirdly, a patchwork of other conditional grants for training, infrastructure, oncology, and digital systems.

The challenge with this approach is that each of these funding streams has its own rules, reporting requirements, and political histories. None of them were designed to work together.

Making the case for consolidation

Twenty odd years ago, the case for split funding streams made more sense. In the early 2000s, South Africa faced an overwhelming HIV epidemic. We needed targeted programmes, ringfenced funds, and rapid scale-up. Conditional grants was an instrument, that in a specific context, helped save millions of lives. But this instrument has now hardened into permanent architecture. And unfortunately, it is not fit for today’s health challenges.

South Africa is at a critical moment. The population is ageing, rates of non-communicable diseases like diabetes and hypertension are rising, HIV and TB require lifelong, coordinated management, and the pace of technology is rapidly reshaping healthcare.

The system that was built 20 years ago simply cannot carry us through the next 20 years.

At the same time, South Africa’s health budget is tightening. Despite a small increase in last year’s budget, the trend over the last decade or so is clearly toward having to do more with less.

We cannot expect the system to meet these growing demands while the foundational governance and funding architecture is no longer fit for purpose.

How it could work

Under an expanded District Health Programme Grant, national government – as the law mandates – would set the healthcare package, standards, indicators, and information requirements. Provinces would continue to run services, hire staff, manage facilities, and account for performance in line with the provisions of the National Health Act. And districts would finally have a budget that reflects their actual responsibilities.

In simple terms, this means that the expanded district health programme will be structured as a conditional grant. It will be informed by a nationally defined package of district health services, developed in consultation with provinces. Provincial allocations will be informed by strategic priorities and service needs such as essential health services, reproductive, maternal and child health services, as well as infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases. The National Department of Health will be responsible for managing the grant conditions with stronger accountability mechanisms to ensure alignment with strategic aims and constitutional responsibilities. Provinces will continue to control human resources, service delivery networks and district variations. This is what the National Health Act intended.

This is the model used by many countries that have successfully strengthened district health systems: national sets the rules and maintains oversight, while provinces or local governments handle delivery.

As already noted, South Africa does have the legal architecture for this. We just don’t have the financial mechanisms in place to match it.

In practical terms, such reforms will mean that for the first time, a district could budget for clinics, ward‑based outreach teams, HIV and TB services, chronic disease management, district hospitals, laboratory and pharmacy systems, emergency medical services linkages, and digital and information systems.

The artificial lines between primary healthcare and district hospitals would disappear. The system would fund itself as the Act intended, as one. District hospitals would no longer be expected to manage pressures created by primary healthcare gaps they have no control over.

There are several other benefits, such as improved accountability, an easier adaptation to demographic and epidemiological transitions, and more efficient use of limited budgets. These ultimately all develop a realistic pathway to universal health coverage.

A governance correction, not a revolution

There may be concerns that consolidating funding into a single grant means taking power away from provinces. The reality, however, is that this reform would restore coherence, not remove authority.

South Africa has spent decades speaking about equity. This is a practical way to make equity real.

When we underfund the district health system in structure, we undercut the very people who rely on it most. These are rural communities, working class households, and people managing chronic and infectious diseases who require continuity of care, not bureaucratic fragmentation.

A unified District Health Programme Grant will not solve every problem in our health system. But without it, we will continue asking a fragmented system to produce cohesive outcomes, and blaming managers and health workers when it inevitably cannot.

It is time to give the district health system the financial foundation it has always needed. Only then can we build the health system people in South Africa deserve.

*Rensburg is director of the Rural Health Advocacy Project and project director for the TB Accountability Consortium.

Note: Spotlight aims to deepen public understanding of important health issues by publishing a variety of views on its opinion pages. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily shared by the Spotlight editors.

Republished from Spotlight under a Creative Commons licence.

Read the original article.

Categories : Healthcare Politics and Regulations HospitalsTags :

Doctors Complain About Choice of Equipment at Gauteng Hospital as Thousands Await Cancer Scans

On By ModernMedia

Concern about decision to buy Chinese MRI machine from local company instead of one from Philips

Credit: Pixabay CC0

By Chris Bateman and Raymond Joseph

As thousands of cancer patients wait months for diagnostic scans, senior clinicians at Charlotte Maxeke Academic Hospital have questioned a decision by the Gauteng Health Department to override their choice of MRI machine.

In a letter to Gauteng Health Department’s acting chief financial officer, the head of supply chain management at the hospital, Solly Mokgoko, expressed a concern that a recommendation by the head of radiology and the acting clinical director to buy a Philips scanner had been overridden by the Gauteng health department’s central office. The letter is dated 31 October 2025.

Mokgoko said the doctors had preferred the Philips MRI scanner – at a cost of about R27.4-million – on the grounds of “technological advancement, operational sustainability, and clinical research potential”.

However, the department had chosen a machine from Mamello Clinical Solutions at R38.5-million, they said. The room in which the machine will be installed is currently being prepared.

The letter said the Philips unit’s cost “offers reduced lifecycle expenditure due to minimal helium dependency and extended operational uptime”. The Philips scanner used low-maintenance technology, “requiring minimal or no helium top-ups, thereby reducing lifecycle costs and mitigating downtime risks”.

The Mamello-proposed model, by contrast, “relies on traditional cryogenic technology, which entails higher running costs and environmental exposure”, they said.

They said the decision is inconsistent with value-for-money principles set out in the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and Treasury regulations.

The purchase of a Chinese MRI scanner from Mamello is part of a R304-million roll-out of eight scanners across Gauteng public hospitals, in which roughly R190-million has been awarded to Mamello Clinical Solutions (five machines) and the remainder to Philips SA.

The Gauteng Department of Health rejected any suggestion of irregularity, saying the purchase was made under a lawful, competitively awarded contract and that both suppliers met the required technical standards.

In this case, the original procurement contract was drawn up by the Limpopo Health Department, with the Gauteng department piggybacking on it.

Clinicians at Charlotte Maxeke who spoke to GroundUp say the procurement shift occurred without adequate consultation and against explicit technical recommendations — allegations the department disputes.

Approximately 2,600 oncology patients are awaiting MRI scans at Charlotte Maxeke alone, with outpatient bookings extending to December 2026. Similar waiting lists exist at Chris Hani Baragwanath Academic Hospital.

The letter said that besides the external patient scans waiting list, there are over 50 inpatients awaiting scans.

One department head said: “How can the hospital order an MRI that’s over R10-million more expensive in an environment where it can’t even provide decent food, [and where there is] widespread cost-cutting and a dire shortage of doctors?” Late last year, the hospital made headlines for shortages of adequate patient meals.

Mamello Clinical Solutions, a private company based in Polokwane, was established in December 2014, trading as Mamello Development until 2019 when it changed its name. Robert Makhubedu, its sole director, was appointed in June 2023 after two previous directors resigned, according to official company registration records.

Makhubedu previously worked as chief radiographer at Charlotte Maxeke Hospital in the early 1990s, then spent more than two decades as director of business development at Tecmed, before joining Mamello Clinical Solutions.

A Gauteng Health Department spokesperson “categorically” denied any irregular, inflated or non-compliant procurement.

He said the MRI acquisitions had been made under a lawful, competitively advertised contract which had been evaluated in line with constitutional, PFMA and Treasury requirements.

Philips Healthcare and Mamello Clinical Solutions had both met minimum safety, functional and performance specifications, he said.

While acknowledging that Charlotte Maxeke clinicians preferred the Philips MRI, the spokesperson said procurement decisions could not be driven by “brand preference or proprietary technology.” He said over the life of the machine the price difference between the two was about R1.07-million, not R11.1-million.

Treasury rules, he said, did not permit sole-supplier selection where multiple bidders meet approved specifications. Multi-supplier models were standard public-sector practice.

Makhubedu pointed out that the tender had not called for a “helium-free” scanner. He attributed the doctors’ complaints to a combination of “brand bias” and hostility towards emerging black-owned companies, compared to multinationals.

“Some black companies awarded these contracts in the past could not relate to the business and clinical profile of the projects,” he said. “The legacy of that is that you have to prove yourself all the time.”

Makhubedu said that provinces tried to strike a procurement balance between emerging and established companies. He said his scanner was in fact R300,000 cheaper than the Philips machine over the life of the machine, and Mamello was capturing market share because of scanner quality and price.

“We believe we were fairly, legally and transparently awarded the contract. And we were cheaper.”

Republished from GroundUp under a Creative Commons Licence.

Read the original article.

Categories : Expert Opinion Healthcare Politics and RegulationsTags :

Inside The Box with Dr Andy Gray | How Medicines Pricing Works in SA and How it Might Change in Future

On By ModernMedia
#InsideTheBox is a column by Dr Andy Gray, a pharmaceutical sciences expert at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and Co-Director of the WHO Collaborating Centre on Pharmaceutical Policy and Evidence Based Practice. (Photo: Supplied)

By Andy Gray

In South Africa, as in many places, pharmaceutical companies are not free to change medicine prices as they wish. In his latest Inside The Box column, Dr Andy Gray unpacks how medicines prices are regulated in the country and considers how this regulatory framework might change.

South Africa’s medicine pricing policies are recognised internationally for their commitment to transparency, but the reality may be different from what exists on paper.

Medicine pricing is a good example of the deficiencies in the National Drug Policy (NDP), which has never been revised since it was first issued in 1996. The original policy document proposed the establishment of a Pricing Committee and committed to “total transparency in the pricing structure of pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers, providers of services, such as dispensers of drugs, as well as private clinics and hospitals”.

Two key proposals were that “the wholesale and retail percentage mark-up system will be replaced with a pricing system based on a fixed professional fee” and “price increases will be regulated”. There was also a commitment to monitoring prices in comparison to those charged in other countries. Finally, there was this statement: “Where the State deems that the retail prices of certain pharmaceuticals are unacceptable and that these pharmaceuticals are essential to the well being of any sector of the population, the State will make them available to the private sector at acquisition cost plus the transaction costs involved.”

Few policies survive an encounter with reality, and opposition, and this document is no exception.

Never the twain shall meet

A cardinal feature of South Africa’s medicine pricing system is the clear separation between the public and private sectors.

In the public sector, the prices paid by the provinces, military and prison services are the result of a tender process. Only medicines registered by the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority (SAHPRA) may be offered in response to a tender call. The National Department of Health makes all tenders publicly accessible and also publishes the resultant tender awards, as well as the Master Health Products List, updated whenever any listing changes. The prices paid therefore reflect the downward influence of the buying power of the state. The tenders include a quantification of anticipated demand over the tender period (usually three years). Prices are also influenced by the number of potential suppliers and therefore the extent of competition in the market.

For some critical, high-volume medicines, such as the first-line antiretrovirals, the tender is split among multiple suppliers, at slightly different prices. Split tenders are intended to ensure security of supply if a contracted supplier is unable to meet demand.

Where the state accounts for most of the quantity sold in the country, it is usually able to attract bids at lower prices than are charged in the private sector. However, in some cases, tenders attract no bids and the state is forced to purchase on quotation. Where a registered medicine is only available from a single supplier, the price paid by the state may be closer to that paid in the private sector. In November 2025, the Director-General of Health published a statement of concern about bid prices exceeding the private sector single exit price (SEP), urging manufacturers to “reflect on their pricing practices”.

Although there are some limited agreements to provide state stock, such as childhood vaccines, to private healthcare providers, the two distribution chains and their pricing remain separate. The private sector cannot access medicines at the same price as the state.

Private sector – not entirely transparent

The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, 1997, sought to put in place at least some of what was proposed in the 1996 National Drug Policy. After the multinational pharmaceutical industry withdrew a court challenge to the Act in 2001, and after another Amendment Act, the changes came into effect in 2003, but with the pricing portion delayed until 2004. Further delay followed, with court challenges brought by community and hospital pharmacy groups, leading to an eventual Constitutional Court judgment in 2005. While the basic construct remained in place, the government had to revise the dispensing fee.

The basic construct of the pricing provision, which has been inserted into the Medicines and Related Substances Act, 1965, but is not the responsibility of SAHPRA, relies on what is called the SEP. The SEP is defined as “the only price at which manufacturers shall sell medicines and Scheduled substances to any person other than the State”. In other words, the “exit” refers to the price which is charged by the manufacturer to the final seller such as a pharmacy, hospital or healthcare provider. This is a little different from the more commonly used term of a “factory gate price”, which then allows additions to be made at each step in the distribution chain.

The SEP is the price that the final seller charges to the patient or medical scheme. Final sellers are, however, entitled to a dispensing fee, which is set as a maximum each year and differs between pharmacists and licensed dispensing practitioners. Wholesalers do not add a mark-up to the SEP charged by the manufacturer, but are paid a logistics fee by the manufacturer, as a portion of the exit price.

Crucially, the “single” component refers to the intention that the same price would be paid by all buyers, regardless of the volume of medicine procured. In other words, the private sector cannot use its buying power to exert any pressure on manufacturers’ prices. The Act is prescriptive in this regard: “No person shall supply any medicine, medical device or IVD according to a bonus system, rebate system or any other incentive scheme.” While the application of this section to Schedule 0 medicines, medical devices and in vitro diagnostics has been paused, it still applies to other medicines.

Annually, the Pricing Committee asks for input on two elements: the dispensing fees for pharmacists and dispensing practitioners, and the SEP adjustment (SEPA). The latter is a maximum percentage increase that manufacturers can apply to the SEPs on an annual basis. In some years, exceptional additional SEPAs have been allowed, but they have generally mirrored the consumer price index. The SEPA allowed for 2026 was set at a maximum of 1.47%, compared with 5.25% in 2025. The SEPA mechanism has protected South Africa against the large pharmaceutical price increases that have been seen in other countries. However, the initial launch SEP remains unregulated.

The dispensing fees include a flat amount and a percentage of the SEP, varying across 4 price bands. As the price of the medicine increases, the percentage component decreases. For example, the September 2025 version states that where the SEP of a medicine exceeds R1 530.73, the dispensing fee charged by a pharmacist shall not exceed R270.54 + 5% of the SEP.

A spreadsheet showing all declared SEPs (for registered medicines in Schedules 1 to 6) is publicly accessible on the health department’s website. That site also provides access to various SEPA documents. All final sellers are required to disclose to a buyer what the SEP for a medicine is, and then indicate the dispensing fee charged, which cannot exceed the maximum gazetted each year.

So, what’s not transparent?

The first problem lies with the logistics fee paid to wholesalers by manufacturers. Although there is a column in the SEP spreadsheet that shows a logistics fee, the actual amount paid is known to vary considerably. Importantly, where a final seller, such as a large pharmacy chain, owns its own wholesaler, it can gain additional income from the logistics fee. That component is not disclosed to buyers (patients or medical schemes) – but may influence the seller’s ability to charge less than the maximum dispensing fee.

The Act enables the Minister of Health, in consultation with the Pricing Committee, to “prescribe acceptable and prohibited acts” in relation to bonus systems, rebate systems or other incentive schemes. Despite being published for comment on two occasions, in 2014 and in 2017, no final regulations have been issued. The extent to which co-marketing fees, data fees, shelf fees, formulary listing fees, patient assistance programmes, off-invoice rebates and bonus systems have crept back into the private sector is therefore unknown, as is the quantum of such potentially perverse incentives. Certainly, such revenue streams are not transparent to patients and caregivers.

The enforcement capacity of the health department and Pricing Committee is also questionable. South Africa’s much-vaunted transparent medicine pricing system may conceal many unsavoury elements.

New concerns – failure to declare an SEP

Once SAHPRA has registered a new medicine, the online database is updated. However, SAHPRA does not concern itself with pricing. The holder of the certificate of registration (HCR) can choose to sell the medicine only to the state. However, if the HCR wishes to sell the medicine in the private sector, an SEP has to be declared. Some of the questions asked in the declaration form are interesting, but of dubious legal weight. For example, manufacturers are asked: “The methodology used to determine the SEP and factors that influence the price at which the medicine will be sold.” Even though no external reference pricing system is in place, the prices in other countries are requested. While it is reasonable to ask what the registered indications for the medicine are, as approved by SAHPRA, to demand the “prevalence of the disease or condition as established by the applicant in South Africa” is less reasonable. To date, no SEPs have been declared to be “unacceptable”, as was signalled in the NDP in 1996. Manufacturers thus have a relatively free hand to set their private sector launch prices.

However, two high-profile registrations of HIV drugs by SAHPRA, of cabotegravir by GlaxoSmithKline and of lenacapavir by Gilead, have not been followed by the declaration of an SEP. One contributory reason may be a reluctance to make a price to be charged in an upper middle-income country such as South Africa transparent to the rest of world.

Unregistered medicines imported in terms of section 21 (an application to access an unregistered medicine in circumstances where there is no suitable product registered in South Africa) are not subject to the SEP. In the case of the cystic fibrosis treatments sold by the pharmaceutical company Vertex, a refusal to apply for registration by SAHPRA, thus forcing medical schemes and patients to rely on section 21, has allowed the company to reach agreements with specific medical schemes at undisclosed prices. These medicines are not available to public sector patients.

The unknown unknown

Although the National Health Insurance Fund is expected to be an “active purchaser”, using its buying power to exert downward pressure on prices, bolstered by health technology assessment processes, the exact manner in which the prices of medicines will be determined is unclear.

In particular, how the fund will contract with public and private sector providers to serve beneficiaries in a particular geographical area, given the current clear separation in pricing, is yet to be disclosed. Once NHI is fully implemented, the current tender system will not be tenable. A tender award to a single supplier would immediately make all competitors leave the market. Instead, a reimbursement system, perhaps closer to the reference pricing applied in medical scheme formularies, will be needed. The complexity lies in the period of co-existence of the current public and private sectors and a nascent NHI.

Has the NDP 1996 been implemented?

Although a fixed dispensing fee proved impractical, some elements of the 1996 policy are discernible. Regulated price increases are in place, for instance. Other elements are less clearly implemented, and full transparency remains elusive. There is a need to revisit the entirety of the national medicines policy, not least in relation to how best to deliver access to affordable, quality-assured, essential medicines as part of universal health coverage.

*Dr Gray is a Senior Lecturer at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and Co-Director of the WHO Collaborating Centre on Pharmaceutical Policy and Evidence Based Practice. This is part of a series of columns he is writing for Spotlight.

Note: Spotlight aims to deepen public understanding of important health issues by publishing a variety of views on its opinion pages. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily shared by the Spotlight editors.

Republished from Spotlight under a Creative Commons licence.

Read the original article.

Categories : Expert OpinionTags :

Medical Aid Myth Busting: The Misunderstandings We’re Leaving Behind in 2026

On By ModernMedia
Photo by Alex Green on Unsplash

From tracking steps and calories to getting the gains at the gym and taking care of mental and emotional wellness, South Africans have never been more health conscious. At the same time, there is a growing disconnect in how we perceive the systems that protect that health. 

As we step further into 2026, it’s important to debunk the myths around medical aid that often cloud our judgement when it comes to looking after our own health and that of our families. Cover without interruption should be high up on our list of resolutions this year, and to achieve this, it’s important that South Africans get the facts straight.

Myth 1: Medical aid is a luxury

The most pervasive myth is that medical aid is a luxury. The data, in fact, suggests otherwise. According to the Council for Medical Schemes (CMS) 2024 Industry Report, hospital expenditure remains the dominant cost driver in South Africa, accounting for nearly 36% of total benefits paid.

‘Medical aid acts as a bridge to immediate, specialised intervention,’ says Lee Callakoppen, Principal Officer of Bonitas Medical Fund. ‘For a scheme like Bonitas, being a member is a guarantee of access to a network of private facilities when time is the most critical variable.’

Myth 2: Plan adjustments mean lower quality

There is a common fear that moving to a different plan within a scheme is a step backwards. In reality, the healthcare market is defined by customisation, allowing you to choose a plan that fits your specific lifestyle and healthcare needs without paying for bells and whistles you don’t use.

This is best seen in the rise of options that make strict use of networks and digital-first plans like Bonitas’ BonCore that was unveiled in September last year. Network options offer reduced monthly premiums by requiring members to use a specific group of healthcare providers with whom preferential rates have been negotiated. BonCore takes this further by offering a digitally enabled hospital plan that combines unlimited hospital cover with virtual-first primary care. This means that simple GP consultations happen via video link, which lowers costs and increases convenience while still providing a Benefit Booster for physical visits and specialised tests.

Myth 3: Secondary products can stand alone

A dangerous trend has seen some people viewing gap cover or health insurance as a replacement for full medical aid membership. While these tools have their place, they are designed as supplements and not replacements.

Gap cover, for instance, is a vital tool for managing specialist shortfalls, but it relies on the foundation of a medical aid to function. Without that foundation, the protection is incomplete. Real security comes from a holistic ecosystem, with Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs) ensuring that a pre-determined list of chronic conditions and emergency procedures are covered by law, regardless of the plan you choose.

Myth 4: Public-private hybrids are a universal quick fix

While the integration of public and private care is a key pillar of national health policy, the immediate reality for many in 2026 comes down to capacity. Public facilities are under significant strain, and while insurance products linked to public care provide a basic entry point, they often lack the elective agility that private medical aid provides.

In simple terms, this means that while you might be covered for a life-threatening emergency, you could face a very long wait for elective procedures like hip replacements, cataract surgery or specialised scans.

Securing private care through a scheme with a broad national footprint allows for proactive health management and the ability to treat a condition before it becomes a surgical emergency.

Myth 5: Medical schemes prioritise the young and healthy

South African medical schemes operate on a principle of social solidarity. This means that all contributions go into a collective pool of funds to be used by all members, as and when needed.

As per the Medical Scheme’s Act 131 of 1998, open schemes are legally required to accept all applicants. In fact, Bonitas’ 2026 strategy emphasises preventative care for all life stages, which includes a series of health screenings, vaccinations and wellness assessments. This ensures that the Scheme’s R9 billion in reserves is used to keep all members healthy for longer, regardless of age.

‘Ultimately, being a member of a medical aid is about having a partner that bridges the gap between health consciousness and health security. We must move beyond viewing healthcare as a grudge purchase to seeing it as a vital tool for long-term resilience,’ concludes Callakoppen.

Categories : Healthcare Politics and RegulationsTags :

SA has a “Bogus Doctor” Problem

On By ModernMedia
Under South African law, no one may practise medicine unless they have the proper training and are officially registered. Photo by Usman Yousaf on Unsplash

By Elna Schütz

Bogus medical practitioners threaten the health of patients and undermine trust in doctors. The problem might be growing, but so is the fight against it.

“If you’re in the hands of an unqualified person, you’re as well as dead, and we think it is not fair for the country,” Dr Magome Masike tells Spotlight.

He is the Registrar of the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), which is responsible for the registration of medical doctors and other health professionals in South Africa.

The controversy over bogus doctors gained widespread attention in late 2023 when it was discovered that ‘TikTok doctor’ Matthew Lani lied about being a medical doctor. In his videos, Lani was often seen in scrubs and wearing a stethoscope, impersonating a medical doctor. Although he was arrested at Helen Joseph Hospital in Johannesburg, the National Prosecuting Authority eventually decided not to prosecute.

The term bogus doctor has become a shorthand for any medical practitioner who is working without being properly qualified or registered by the HPCSA. In practice, being “bogus” can also apply to physiotherapists, interns, or anyone else practising medicine.

The misrepresentation may include using fraudulent certificates, using another practitioner’s registration, or being suspended or erased from the register. It can involve someone who studied but did not fully qualify, or has not kept up to date with their registration. Masike gives the example of the child of a registered practitioner who decides to take on their parent’s practice after their death without themselves being registered.

It is an ongoing problem. In the beginning of February, the HPCSA says it facilitated the arrest of a woman working at a medical facility in Midrand, north of Johannesburg, allegedly without being correctly registered to practice medicine.

Bogus qualifications are part of the larger problem of healthcare fraud. According to research in a report by risk management services firm D-Finitive, it is estimated that this fraud overall costs African countries more than USD50 billion in 2012. In the South African private sector, that comes to about R22-28 billion a year. The report explains that beyond bogus practitioners, there is a problem with similar fraud, like doctors billing more clients than is realistic, manipulating diagnostic and procedural codes, or deceased doctors billing the government for decades after their death. At times, this type of fraud is reportedly executed by syndicates.

“While the majority of practitioners are honest and committed to patient care, it takes only a small number of bad actors, whether unregistered impostors or credentialed professionals abusing the system, to inflict widespread damage,” says Dr Katlego Mothudi, Managing Director of the Board of Healthcare Funders (BHF).

A substantial problem

Masike says that from March 2024 to February 2025, 49 bogus practitioners were caught and arrested. From April to December 2025, that number was at 17. Even though these numbers do not suggest a year-on-year increase, Masike says that overall, the numbers are increasing.

The HPCSA’s annual report for 2024/2025 shows that 589 investigations into unregistered persons were concluded in the year in question. Over the past five years, 3 708 complaints were received.

The majority of bogus practitioners who have been caught were operating in economic hubs of the Western Cape, Gauteng, and KwaZulu-Natal, Masike says. “Bogus people want money, so they go where there’s money,” he explains. However, while the trend tends urban, he says rural communities also fall prey to scammers.

“A notable pattern is that many of these individuals use or forge the details of legitimately registered practitioners,” Masike says.

It is, of course, unclear how many unlicensed practitioners are not yet caught. “We can tell you the problem is bigger than we think,” Masike says. The problem, he says, is sector-wide and stretches across different health professions, with most of these illegal practices occurring in the private sector. Masike adds that bogus doctors often work with a network of others, for example, those who supply unregistered or fake medicines.

Mothudi also says that the problem is growing. “Medical schemes are seeing a rise in suspicious provider activity picked up through claims analysis and credential verification processes,” he says. This may include practitioners misrepresenting their registration status, practising outside their approved scope, or using the registration details of legitimate practitioners to submit claims.

Risk to patients

Catching and prosecuting bogus practitioners is crucial because they can pose a direct danger to unsuspecting patients. “Unregistered medical doctors, like other health professionals, pose severe risks to patients, including serious physical harm, injury, and misdiagnosis which may lead to death, due to their lack of necessary training, ethical standards and relevant qualifications,” warns Foster Mohale, the spokesperson for the National Department of Health.

Dr Zanele Bikitsha, National Vice Chairperson of the South African Medical Association, cautions that if bogus doctors are performing procedures, it will likely be in settings that are not appropriate or sterile.

“They’re not going to go to a registered facility, because they know they’ll be caught, so this puts patients in danger as well.”

While some operate on a cash basis, Mothudi says that submitting claims to medical schemes is attractive because it allows for much larger and repeatable payouts. “In some cases, bogus practitioners submit claims using stolen, borrowed or fraudulently obtained practice numbers belonging to legitimately registered healthcare professionals,” he says. “In other instances, they collude with registered providers who allow their credentials to be misused in exchange for payment.”

Knowing the signs

While the HPCSA undertakes compliance inspections, there are some clear signs that might help the public spot a bogus practitioner. Firstly, it is a legal requirement to have registration information easily visible in a practitioner’s practice and on the letterhead of documents or prescription notes.

Members of the public can also look up a doctor’s credentials. All registered practitioners should be listed in the HPCSA’s digital register online, which is publicly searchable. With as little as the practitioner’s surname, the system lets users search for registered practitioners.

Masike points out that a trained doctor tends to take an extensive medical history and make a systemic or wide-reaching inquiry. He recommends that patients look out for how doctors speak and whether they use and are able to explain medical terminology.

Complaints can be filed with the HPCSA’s Inspectorate, including anonymously. Their call centre is at 0123389300/1 and they can be e-mailed at office@hpcsa.co.za. Suspicious practitioners may also be reported to hospitals, the Department of Health, SAMA or other medical organisations.

Processing the problem

Complaints typically lead to an investigation by the HPCSA Inspectorate, which works together with other entities, such as the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority (SAHPRA), the Office of Health Standards Compliance, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), and the South African Police Service.

Masike explains that the investigation tends to lead to a clandestine operation and involves the police arresting the suspects. He adds that police recently assigned specific staff members to focus on these cases. He says that once the case goes to court, there is a conviction rate of around 77%, although this may have changed. “Many of the cases from 2023 to 2025 remain before the courts, and therefore updated conviction statistics are not yet available.”

Practising medicine without proper training and registration is in contravention of Section 17(1) of the Health Professions Act, 56 of 1974. Typical sentences for such fraud include fines, such as R12 000, or around two years imprisonment. In one 2017 case, a man who had treated almost a thousand patients over six years was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment by the Mahikeng High Court in the North West.

Bikitsha says there are other systemic changes that could help catch the problem earlier on. “If you are still paper-based, you are at risk,” she says, referring to the way that hospitals and institutes tend to verify the qualifications of most interns, locums and medical practitioners. She argues that upgrading to biometrics and digital systems would decrease the risk of fraud.

Another step forward is simply to increase public awareness and education, so that patients know the risks.

Masike concurs. “We need society to stand up to this,” he says. “We need a participating community to get rid of this malaise, otherwise it will continue forever.”

Republished from Spotlight under a Creative Commons licence.

Read the original article.

Categories : HIV Medical IndustryTags :

Cipla Confirms Continued Support for ARV Supply Following Changes in Supplier Landscape

On By ModernMedia
Photo by Towfiqu barbhuiya

Cipla Medpro South Africa reaffirmed its commitment to ensuring the uninterrupted supply of critical antiretroviral (ARV) medicines to the Department of Health. It is essential that people living with HIV have uninterrupted access to these life-saving medicines. Any disruption of supply puts patients at risk of developing resistance to the drugs or adversely affecting health outcomes. According to Statistics South Africa, the number of people living with HIV in the country is estimated to be approximately 8 million (12,7% of the population)[1].

Recently, two suppliers who were awarded the current antiretroviral (ARV) tender, Barrs Pharmaceuticals Industries (Pty) Ltd and Innovata Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd (subsidiaries of Avacare Health), have entered business rescue.

Cipla acknowledges the uncertainty this may create within the ARV supply chain and underscores its readiness to assist in maintaining stability and continuity.

Cipla has been manufacturing tenofovir/lamivudine/dolutegravir (TLD) for the government for the past 7 years, and has been one of the main suppliers of ARVs to the government for more than 12 years. Cipla has made significant investments in its local manufacturing facility, upgrading the capacity of the ARV production line with the installation of a new Countec bottle line and have increased its tablet filing capacity by 190%. The company is able to locally produce 475 million tablets annually and has upscaled its manufacturing capabilities to ensure sufficient capacity to meet current demand and support near‑term growth, while reinforcing Cipla’s commitment to secure and reliable ARV supply.

“We have mobilised resources to help maintain equitable access to quality, affordable critical medication. Cipla confirms its willingness to support national requirements under the current tender agreement and, if needed, contribute meaningfully to any supplementary procurement processes to safeguard patient access to essential treatment. We want people to live a long and healthy life as part of our commitment to caring for life,” said Paul Miller, CEO of Cipla Africa.

“In addition, we believe this tender presents an opportunity to further advance government’s commitment to strengthening local manufacturing capacity. By ensuring greater support for locally produced medicines, future allocations could meaningfully contribute to South Africa’s industrial development agenda while maintaining continuity of supply,” said Miller.

The total ARV tender is for a period of three years, and is worth an estimated R15.5bn, of which the TLD component comprises R12.6bn.